Research

I have research interests in epistemology and the ethics of AI. As part of the Experiential AI program at Northeastern, I work with Prof. Tina Eliassi-Rad on ethics and artificial intelligence. We are currently working on projects concerning fairness and explainability in machine learning.

My research in epistemology concerns inquiry and intellectual virtue. For instance, I am interested in what kinds of reasons and values researchers should be sensitive to during inquiry, and in the kinds of attitudes it is rational for researchers to have to their theories. I have argued that it is often irrational to believe one's favored theory; instead, the appropriate attitude is one that I call endorsement. This attitude is rationally sensitive to epistemic considerations that go beyond evidence. I call these considerations inquisitive reasons.

Publications

  1. Pursuit and Inquisitive Reasons. forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science.

  2. Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms​, (with Dunja Šešelja), forthcoming in Philosophy of Science. Preprint.

  3. Fragmentation and Old Evidence. forthcoming in Episteme. Preprint. Supplementary material.

  4. What's Fair about Individual Fairness? In Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '21). Preprint.

  5. RAWLSNET: Altering Bayesian Networks to Encode Rawlsian Fair Equality of Opportunity. (with Tina Eliassi-Rad, Scott Alfeld, David Liu, and Zohair Shafi). In Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES '21). Open access.

  6. How to Endorse Conciliationism. Synthese 198 (10): 9913-9939. 2021. Preprint.

  7. Endorsement and Assertion. Noûs 55(2): 363–384. 2021. Preprint.

  8. Publishing without (Some) Belief. Thought 9 (4): 237–246. 2020. Preprint.

  9. Epistemic Circularity and Method Coherence. Erkenntnis 84 (2): 455–480. 2019. Preprint.

  10. Rational Endorsement. Philosophical Studies, 175 (10): 2649–2675, 2018. Preprint.

  11. Virtuous Distinctions. Synthese, 194 (8):2973–3003, 2017. Preprint.

Public Philosophy

Philosophy Phriday: Ruining Picnics with Epistemology. A blog post I wrote about ants.