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My primary research concerns the epistemology of inquiry. For instance, I am interested in what kinds of reasons and values researchers should be sensitive to, and what attitude it is rational to have toward one's favored theory during inquiry. I argue that it is often irrational to believe one's favored theory; instead, the appropriate attitude is one that I call endorsement. This attitude is governed by a set of norms I call inclusive epistemic rationality, which is sensitive to considerations of what will promote successful inquiry.  I also have a research project building on my published work involving virtue epistemology and reliabilism. In addition, I am working on projects involving fragmentation of mental states, collective epistemic responsibility, and the epistemology and ethics of data and technology.

Journal Articles

Endorsement and Assertion

forthcoming in Noûs. Penultimate draft here.

Epistemic Circularity and Method Coherence

Erkenntnis 84 (2): 455-480. 2019. Penultimate draft here.

Rational Endorsement

Philosophical Studies, 175 (10): 2649-2675, 2018. Penultimate draft here.


Virtuous Distinctions

Synthese, 194 (8):2973–3003, 2017. Penultimate draft here.

Public Philosophy

Philosophy Phriday: Ruining Picnics with Epistemology

A blog post I wrote about ants.

Works in Progress

How to Endorse Conciliationism

under review, draft here.

Fragmentation and Old Evidence

under review, draft here.

Publishing Without (Some) Belief

under review, draft here.

Collective Epistemic Responsibility

(with Dunja Šešelja) in preparation, draft available on request.