I have research interests in epistemology and the ethics of AI.

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Concerning the ethics of AI, I have written about algorithmic fairness and and about algorithmic opacity. Currently, I am working on a project that appeals to the notion of understanding as the fundamental concept for thinking about how to alleviate the opacity of complex AI systems. I also argue that explainable AI (XAI) methods can be seen as a kind of idealized scientific modeling. This "models of models" approach suggests that XAI methods are more promising as a means of alleviating opacity than some have feared. It also promises some guidance on development of future XAI methods.

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My research in epistemology concerns inquiry and intellectual virtue. For instance, I am interested in what kinds of reasons and values researchers should be sensitive to during inquiry, and in the kinds of attitudes it is rational for researchers to have to their theories. I have argued that it is often irrational to believe one's favored theory; instead, the appropriate attitude is one that I call endorsement. This attitude is rationally sensitive to epistemic considerations that go beyond evidence. I call these considerations inquisitive reasons.