I have research interests in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and the ethics of AI. As part of the Experiential AI program at Northeastern, I will be working with Prof. Tina Eliassi-Rad on ethics and artificial intelligence. We are currently working on a project concerning fairness in social networks.

My research in epistemology and philosophy of mind concerns inquiry and intellectual virtue. For instance, I am interested in what kinds of reasons and values researchers should be sensitive to during inquiry, and in the kinds of attitudes it is rational for researchers to have to their theories. I have argued that it is often irrational to believe one's favored theory; instead, the appropriate attitude is one that I call endorsement. This attitude is rationally sensitive to epistemic considerations that go beyond evidence. I call these considerations inquisitive reasons.

Journal Articles

Endorsement and Assertion

forthcoming in Noûs. Penultimate draft here.

How to Endorse Conciliationism

forthcoming in Synthese. Penultimate draft here.

Epistemic Circularity and Method Coherence

Erkenntnis 84 (2): 455-480. 2019. Penultimate draft here.

Rational Endorsement

Philosophical Studies, 175 (10): 2649-2675, 2018. Penultimate draft here.


Virtuous Distinctions

Synthese, 194 (8):2973–3003, 2017. Penultimate draft here.

Public Philosophy

Philosophy Phriday: Ruining Picnics with Epistemology

A blog post I wrote about ants.

Works in Progress

Fragmentation and Old Evidence

revise and resubmit, draft here.

Publishing Without (Some) Belief

revise and resubmit, draft here.

Collective Epistemic Responsibility

​(with Dunja Šešelja) under review, draft here.

Intellectual Courage and Inquisitive Reasons

in preparation

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